Is saving too low in the United States? by William E. Cullison
Is  Saving  Too,  Low  in  the  United  States? 
lTUh.z  E.  Cul/son 
A high  America  savkzgs  rate wouhi enhance our mmomk indepenrlkr  reduce in$ationary 
przssum,  incmzse  prvdtitivity,  inzpme  living star&m& and enabk  us to reduce w/rat  are 
still obscenely  kg/l  interest  rates after ckxe to a  &cad? of disb$Won.  Wliat zi nee&d sj a 
national,  nonpahan  ej%rt to imm  he&an  savings,  incZud..ng  betkpr incenk~  @r 
priwate tz?h~mm??zt  plans and a jim  rkn  on taxRF  gmmaLiy. 
-Louis  Rukeyser 
America’s saviq-s c&k  is a  chknera.  Lhifferent  accounting rnethoa3  nzake it. szm  as if the 
U.S.  zk dangervusb  behind  Japan  in  QZV&IS  and  investment. But  wtkn  the nectx~ry 
ad+tmentx  &e  ma&  the gap d-kappeaar 
-Paul  Craig  Roberts 
The  foregoing  statement  by  Louis  Rukeyser,  host 
of the  public  television  program  “Wall  Street  Week,” 
was published  in his  nationally  syndicated  newspaper 
column-run  August  19,  1989  in the  local Richmond 
newspaper  [ 171.  Rukeyser  also  stated  that  the 
Japanese  save  at  a  rate  three  times  the  U.S.  rate, 
which  “.  .  .  enables  such  foreigners  to  amass  the 
means  to  both  finance  our  deficits  .  .  . and  to  buy 
American  property.” 
Martin  Feldstein,  former  Chairman  of  the  Presi- 
dent’s  Council  of  Economic  Advisers,  has  also 
lamented  the  low rate  of saving in the  U.S.  economy, 
stating: 
The  United  States  has  long  had  one  of  the  lowest  saving 
rates  in  the  world.  .  .  . The  low  race  of  saving  means  that 
the  United  States  has  a lower  rate  of  income  and  possibly 
a  substantially  lower  level  of  income  growth  than  would 
otherwise  be  possible.  The  already  low  rate  of  saving  fell 
precipitously  in  the  1980s.  [7,  p.41. 
Observers  in  other  countries  are  also  concerned 
about  declining  savings  rates.  The  British  Economist, 
for  example,  has  recently  published  an  article  con- 
cerning  the  worldwide  reduction  in the  savings  rate, 
stating: 
. . . Over  the  past  three  decades  saving  has  fallen  sharply 
in  almost  every  rich  country.  The  industrial  countries  as  a 
group  have  saved  less  than  10%  of  their  income  in  the 
198Os,  compared  with  15%  or  so  in  the  1960s.  This 
decline  has  come  at  an  awkward  time.  In  the  1990s  and 
beyond,  demands  on  the  world’s  pool  of  savings  are  likely 
to  be  huge.  (21,  p.131 
Feldstein,  Rukeyser,  and  the  Economtit  summarize 
fairly  well  the  conventional  wisdom  about  saving  in 
the  U.S.  and  world  economies.  But  other  observers 
contend  that  the  conventional  wisdom  may  be wrong. 
For  example,  in  addition  to  Paul  Craig  Roberts 
(quoted  above),  Robert  Eisner  (51 and  Robert  J. 
Samuelson  [ 181 have  also written  columns  critical  of 
the  conventional  wisdom.  Eisner’s  piece  is  titled 
“Low  U.S.  Savings  Rate:  A Myth,”  while  Samuelson’s 
is  titled  “The  Great  Savings  Debate:  A  Smoke 
Screen.” 
This  article  examines  the  concept  of  saving  and 
evaluates  the  contentions  that  the  growth  rate  of U.S. 
saving  in the  1980s  has  been  slow  relative  to  its own 
past  and  slow  relative  to  the  rates  of  saving  and 
investment  registered  in’other  countries.  The  paper 
is  organized  as  follows: 
I.  Saving  and  Investment  Defined:  these 
definitions  are  necessary  for  evaluating 
savings  statistics 
II.  National  Income  and  Product  Accounts 
(NIPA):  definitions 
III.  The  Current  Condition  of  U.S.  Saving  and 
Investment,  NIPA  basis 
IV.  Alternatives  or  Complements  to  the  NIPA: 
including  United  Nations  System  of  National 
Accounts  (UNSNA),  Flow-of-Funds, 
Hendershott-Peek,  Total  Incomes  System  of 
Accounts  (TISA),  and  Jorgenson-Fraumeni 
20  ECONOMIC  RMEW.  MAY/JUNE  1990 V.  Comparison  of Systems  of National  Accounts: 
The  Historical  Record:  current  and  past  U.S. 
savings  compared  under  different 
methodologies 
VI.  Interim  Conclusions  and  Observations 
VII.  U.S.  Saving  Relative  to  Saving  in  Other 
Industrial  Countries 
VIII.  Conclusions  , 
. 
I. 
SAWNGAND  INVESTMENT  DEFINED 
What  is saving?  Children  are  encouraged  to  save 
by  putting  their  loose  change  into  a “piggy”  bank. 
The  concept  of saving  that  parents  attempt  to teach 
their  children  is  that  if they  refrain  from  spending 
now,  they  can  get  something  better  in  the  future. 
Thus,  saving  takes  place  when  consumption  is 
foregone. 
The  definition  of saving  from  an economist’s  point 
of view is analogous  to the  view  of saving that  parents 
teach  to  children;  namely,  saving  is refraining  from 
consuming.  Can  one  spend  his  income  and  still  be 
saving?  Yes.  Suppose  an  entrepreneurial  child  who 
has  a lemonade  stand  uses  his  earnings  to  buy  addi- 
tional  lemons  and  sugar  instead  of putting  them  in 
the piggy  bank.  The  parent  would  undoubtedly  com- 
mend  the  child for using  money  wisely,  but probably 
would  not  think  that  the  child  had  saved  the  money. 
Economists,  on  the  other  hand,  would  consider  the 
young  entrepreneur’s  action  as saving  (and investing 
in inventory).  The  key  is that  goods  purchased  for 
investment  are  not  consumed. 
The  Equality of Saving and Investment 
In  the  case  of the  young  entrepreneur,  all of the 
money  saved  was  invested.  This  concept-what  is 
saved  is invested-is  important.  Saving  and  invest- 
ment  are  usually  different  acts  by  different  people. 
Nonetheless,  from  an  economist’s  viewpoint,  the 
amount  of total  saving  in an economy  is always  equal 
to  the  amount  of  total  investment. 
Thus,  to an economist,  a statement  that  the  U.S. 
savings  rate  is too  low  is equivalent  to  a statement 
that  the  U.S.  is consuming  too  much  and  investing 
too  little  of its national  output.  The  debate  about  the 
adequacy  of  the  savings  rate,  therefore,  is  essen- 
tially  a debate  about  the  future  growth  of the  U.S. 
economy  and  whether  there  is  sufficient  plant  and 
equipment  spending  to  sustain  adequate  future 
economic  growth. 
The  logic of the  somewhat  counterintuitive  equality 
between  saving  and investment  can  be  illustrated  by 
the  following  simplification.  A certain  quantity  of real 
goods  and  services  will be produced  in the  economy 
this year.  Those  who  buy  the  goods  and  services  will 
either  consume  them  or use  them  to  produce  other 
goods.  Thus,  national  product  (X)  is equal  to  con- 
sumption  (C) plus investment  (I). By the  same  token, 
incomes  (wages,  rents,  interest,  and  profits)  are 
generated  when  the  national  product  is  produced. 
The  sum  of  these  incomes,  known  as  the  national 
income  (Y),  goes  to  firms  and  individuals,  who 
either  use it for consumption  (C) or savings  (S). Since 
national  product  is equal  to  national  income,  saving 





so,  because  X  =  Y, 
s  =  I. 
INCOME  AND 
II. 
THE NATIONAL 
PRODUCT  ACCOUNTS 
The  U.S.  National  Income  and  Product  Accounts 
(NIPA)  are  compiled  and  reported  quarterly  by  the 
Bureau  of  Economic  Analysis  (BEA)  of  the  U.S. 
Department  of Commerce.  Virtually  all of the  debate 
about  the  existence  or extent  of a saving  and  invest- 
ment  shortage  in  the  Unites  States  has  to  do  with 
definitions  used  in the  NIPA,  mainly  those  relating 
to decisions  about  what  goods  and  services  to include 
in national  production.and,  of those  included,  which 
to count  as being  “used  up” or “consumed.”  A review 
of  the  NIPA  is  thus  in  order. 
The  NIPA  defines  National  Income  as  the  sum 
of wages,  rents,  interest,  and  profits,  and  Net  Na- 
tional Product  as the  measure  of national  product  that 
is conceptually  equal  to  the  National  Income.1  The 
Net  National  Product  (NNP)  thus  is  the  NIPA  ac- 
count  that  corresponds  to “X” in the  conceptual  ex- 
ample  above.  Gross  National  Product  (GNP),  which 
is the most  widely  publicized  NIPA  measure,  is equal 
to  NNP  plus  depreciation. 
* Net  National  Product  is not  quite  equal  to  National  Income. 
It  differs  because  of  indirect  business  taxes,  business  transfer. 
payments,  statistical  discrepancy,  and  subsidies. 
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services  produced  in the  country  in a year,  and  they 
are  divided  into  subaccounts  by  type  of purchaser 
of the  good  or service.  For  example,  NNP  is broken 
down  into  Personal  Cqnsumption  Expenditures  (pur- 
chases  by consumers),  Net  Private  Domestic  Invest- 
ment  (net  purchases  of investment  goods  and  addi- 
tions  to  inventory  by  businesses),  Government 
Purchases  of Goods  and  Services,  and  Net  Exports. 
GNP  has  the  same  breakdown  except  that  the  in- 
vestment  account  is Gross  Private  Domestic  Invest- 
ment,  which  is  net  investment  plus  depreciation. 
The  NIPA  adopts  the  concept  of  saving  dis- 
cussed  in the  section  above,  namely,  that  saving  is 
refraining  from  consuming.  Thus,  the  NIPA  defines 
personal  saving  as that  part  of personal  income  that 
is  neither  paid  out  in  taxes  nor  spent  for  personal 
outlays.*  Consistently,  business  saving  is defined  as 
that  part  of profits  that  is neither  paid  out  in  taxes 
nor  distributed  to  shareholders,  and government  sav- 
ing (or dissaving)  is the  combined  budget  surplus  (or 
deficit)  of federal,  state,  and  local governments.  The 
sum  of personal,  business,  and  governmental  saving 
equals  the  sum  of net  private  domestic  investment 
and  net  foreign  investment.3 
The  reader  may  have  noticed  that  NNP  differs 
from  “X” in the  simplified  example  of the  preceding 
section  in that  it has separate  government  and foreign 
accounts.  This  segregation  of  the  government  and 
the  foreign  sectors  results  from  special  treatment  ac- 
corded  government  and foreign  investment  spending. 
Government  capital  formation  (or investment)  is not 
recognized  in  the  NIPA;  government  purchases  of 
investment-type  goods  and  services  are  not  con- 
sidered  investment.  Also,  the  funds  used  to purchase 
such  goods  are  not  considered  to  be  saving.  This 
treatment  of government  purchases  is not  followed 
by  most  countries.4 
The  NIPA  also  segregate  the  foreign  sector  and 
include  net  exports  (exports  minus  imports)  as  an 
element  of national  product.  The  rationale  for  this 
treatment  is that  when  individuals  (firms)  purchase 
imported  goods  for  consumption  (investment)  pur- 
poses,  those  goods  are  included  in  the  personal 
consumption  expenditure  (domestic  investment)  ac- 
count,  but  they  are  not  produced  in  the  United 
States,  so  they  should  not  be  included  in  the  U.S. 
national  product.  On  the  other  hand,  when  foreigners 
abroad  buy  U.S.  goods,  the  value  of the  goods  is not 
included  in  U.S.  consumption  or  investment  ac- 
counts,  but  the  goods  are  produced  in the  U.S.,  so 
they  should  be included  in the  U.S.  national  product. 
This  method  works  welI for determining  the  market 
value  of  final  goods  and  services  produced  in  the 
U.S.,  which  is  the  definition  of  national  .product, 
but  because  net  exports  are defined  as part  of invest- 
ment,  it  can  produce  anomalies  in  the  investment 
account.5 
Critique  of NIPA  Investment 
The  NIPA  definition  of  investment  has  been 
criticized  for  its  treatment  of net  exports  as foreign 
investment  and  because  it excludes  from  investment: 
(1) all types  of government  spending,  (2) alI consumer 
durables  purchases,  (3)  “human  capital”  spending, 
and  (4)  most  research  and  development  spending. 
Discussion  of  these  criticisms  follows. 
Net  foreign  investment  is defined  as  net  exports 
less transfer  payments  to foreigners  and  government 
interest  payments  to  foreigners.  This  definition 
means  that  a consumer  in Japan  who  buys  and  eats 
an American-made  frozen  pizza  adds  to U.S.  invest- 
ment,  while  a  police  department  in  Maryland  that 
buys  a Japanese-made  truck  reduces  U.S.  investment. 
2 Mainly  purchases  of goods  and  services  for current  consump- 
tion,  but  outlays  also  include  interest  payments  to  businesses 
and  net  personal  transfer  payments  to  foreigners. 
3 Personal  saving  in the  NIPA  is derived  by deducting  personal 
taxes  and  personal  consumption  expenditures  from  personal 
income.  Business  saving  is  found  by  summing  undistributed 
corporate  profits  (plus  the  inventory  valuation  and  capital  con- 
sumption  adjustments),  corporate  and  noncorporate  capital  con- 
sumption  allowances,  and  net  wage  accruals.  Government 
saving  is  the  sum  of  the  Federal  and  state  and  local  budget 
surpluses  (or deficits,  which  are counted  as negative  saving).  Net 
foreign  investment  is defmed  as  exports  of goods  and  services 
less  imports,  transfer  payments  to  foreigners,  and  government 
interest  payments  to  foreigners. 
4 See  the  discussion  of the  United  Nations  System  of National 
Accounts,  below. 
5 Some  economists  have  been  concerned  with  the  relation  bet- 
ween  saving  rates  and  capital  flows  across  countries.  Their  argu- 
ment  goes  that  since  X  -  M  =  S  -  I,  where  X  -  M  is  net 
exports,  S is saving,  and  I is private  domestic  investment,  any 
excess  of investment  over  saving  must  be  offset  by  a deficit  in 
the  balance  of  payments  current  account.  This  deficit  in  the 
balance  of payments  account  is interpreted  to mean  that  foreign 
capital  flows  into  the  deficit  country  to  supplement  domestic 
saving. 
This  seemingly  simple  argument  is  actually  incredibly  com- 
plex,  involving  real  exchange  rates,  real  interest  rates,  marginal 
propensities  to  consume  and  import,  and  potential  investment 
opportunities.  It is too  complex  to investigate  here  in any depth. 
Interested  readers  are  invited  to  read  Roger  S.  Smith’s  com- 
prehensive  review  article  1191. Smith  concludes  that  much  of 
the  economists’  concern  about  the  relatiori between  savings  rates 
and  capital  flows  is  misplaced. 
22  ECONOMIC  REVIEW.  MAY/JUNE  1990 Of these  two  examples,  only  the  second  transaction, 
which  reduces  measured  investment,  actually  adds 
to  the  real  capital  stock  in  the  U.S. 
Although  consumer  purchases  of new  housing  are 
defined  as  investment,  the  NIPA  do  not  consider 
consumer  purchases  of durable  goods  to  be  invest- 
ment.  Thus,  consumer  purchases  of automobiles  are 
considered  as  current  consumption  even  though 
automobiles,  like  houses  and  other  capital  goods, 
yield  a stream  of services  over  a period  of many  years. 
Business  purchases  of  automobiles,  on  the  other 
hand,  are  defined  as  investment. 
A number  of economists  have  criticized  the  treat- 
ment  of government  expenditures  and consumer  pur- 
chases  of durables  in the  U.S.  nationai  income  and 
product  accounts.  As  Robert  Eisner  puts  it: 
If  Hera,  Avis,  or  any  other  private  company  buys  an 
automobile,  that  constitutes  investment.  If a police  car  or 
any  other  automobile  is purchased  by  any  branch  of  gov- 
ernment,  that  shows  up  merely  in “government  purchases 
of  goods  and  services.”  And  automobiles  purchased  by 
households  are part  of personal  consumption  expenditures. 
Yet,  in  terms  of  economic  theory  and  analysis,  the  auto- 
mobile  in each  case,  like  any  other  durable  good,  is invest- 
ment  in that  it will provide  future  services.  . . . Is  a nation 
really  investing  less  if  it  builds  highways  and  produces 
automobiles  than  if  it  invests  in  trains  and  busses?  (6, 
PP.  6-71 
The  NIPA  definition  of  investment  excludes 
expenditures  for  human  capital  (such  as education, 
job  training,  health,  etc.).  These  expenditures  are 
classified  as  current  consumption,  as  are  other  ex- 
penditures  designed  to  maintain  or  improve  one’s 
ability  to  work.  Business  spending  for  research 
and  development  is  also  excluded  from  business 
investment. 
Eisner  has  also  criticized  these  exclusions: 
Research  and  development  efforts  by  business are  treated 
as intermediate  products,  .  .  . research  and  development 
expenditures  by  nonprofit  institutions  turn  up  as  con- 
sumption,  .  .  . and  government  expenditures  for  research 
are  buried  in  .  .  .  government  purchases  of  goods  and 
services.  Yet,  research  and  development  expenditures  may 
well prove  more  of an economic  investment  in future  output 
than  much  of  what  is  currently  treated  as  “gross  invest- 
ment.”  And  what  are  we  to  make  of  the  vast  amounts  of 
expenditures  .  .  .  for  education,  training,  and  health,  let 
alone  the  raising  of our  children,  which  create  the  human 
capital  on  which  our  future  depends?  Can  we  confidently 
say  that’  the  United  States  is  lagging  far  behind  other 
nations  in  investment  without  counting  R&D,  education, 
government  capital,  and  expenditures  for  household  dur-, 
ablesin  ways  that  are  comprehensive  as  well  as  compar- 
able  across  countries?  [6,  pp.  6-71 
The  implications  of the  exclusions  of government 
and  consumer  purchases  of investment-type  goods, 
R&D  spending,  and human  capital expenditures  from 
the  NIPA  definition  of  investment  have  been  ana- 
lyzed  extensively  in the  economics  literature.  Before 
discussing  these  analyses,  this  article  examines  the 
current  condition  of U.S.  saving  and  investment  as 
depicted  by  the  NIPA. 
III. 
THE CURRENT  CONDITION  OF  U.S.  SAVING 
ANDINVESTMENT,  NIPA  BASIS 
Chart  1 displays  gross  saving  as  a percent  of the 
Gross  National  Product  and  net  saving  as a percent 
of Net  National  Product.  As the chart  indicates,  gross 
saving  as  a percent  of GNP  has  declined  in  recent 
years.  It averaged  16.5  percent  from  1960  to  1981, 
14.3  percent  in  1982-1984,  and  12.9  percent  in 
1985-1989. 
A better  measure  of the  potential  effects  of saving 
and  investment  on  the  economy,  however,  is given 
by  net  saving  and  investment,  which  exclude 
depreciation.  It  is important  to  know,  for  example, 
whether  a firm’s  purchase  of  five  new  machines  is 
made  to  add  to  its  capacity  or  whether  the  five 
machines  simply  replace  five old worn-out  machines. 
Chart  1  also  illustrates  that  net  saving  has  de- 
clined  relatively  more  than  gross  saving  in  recent 
years.  Net  saving  as a percent  of NNP  averaged  8.0 
percent  from  1960-1981,  3.0  percent  from  1982- 
1984,  and  2.4  percent  from  1985-1989.  This  reduc- 
tion  in  saving  is  consistent  with  the  Feldstein- 
Rukeyser  statements  mentioned  at  the  outset. 
Chart 1 
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ment  saving  as  percentages  of NNP.  Net  business 
savings  averaged  3.1  percent  of NNP  in  1960- 198 1, 
1.9  percent  in  1982-1984,  and  2.0  percent  in 
1985-1989.  Net  personal  saving  averaged  5.6  per- 
cent  of  NNP  in  1960-1981,  4.9  percent  in  1982- 
84,  and  3.4  percent  in  1985-89.  Net  government 
saving  (dissaving  actually),  on  the  other  hand,  fell 
from  -0.7  percent  of  NNP  in  1960-81  to  -3.8 
percent  in  1982-84,  recovering  to  -2.9  percent  in 
1985-89. 
Federal,  state,  and  local  governments  ran  com- 
bined  deficits  that  averaged  2.2  percentage  points 
more  of  NNP  in  1985-89  than  in  1960-8  1.  The 
culprit  in government  saving  was the  Federal  govern- 
ment,  however,  because  state  and local governments 
ran larger  surpluses  in  1982-89  than  in  1960-81.  The 
Federal  government  deficit,  by contrast,  averaged  1.2 
percent  of  NNP  over  1960-81,  5.4  percent  over 
1982-84,  and  4.3  percent  in  1985-89. 
Are  saving  and  investment  in the  national  accounts 
measured  correctly,  and  if not,  is mismeasurement 
or  misinterpretation  responsible  for  the  U.S.  “sav- 
ings  crisis?’  Several  economists  have  constructed 
alternative  measures  of  national  investment  and 
saving.  Many  of these  alternative  systems  of national 
accounts,  particularly  those  that  include  nonmarket 
activities  and/or  human  capital  investment,  yield 
estimates  of saving  and  investment  that  are strikingly 
different  from  the  NIPA  estimates.  The  paragraphs 
below  review  these  reconstructions  and  the 
arguments  put  forward  by  their  proponents. 
Percent 
Chart 2 
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Iv. 
ALTE~KFMXS  0R  COMPLEMENTS 
TO  THE  NIPA 
A number  of attempts  are  being  made  to  provide 
measures  of  economic  welfare  that  are  legitimate 
alternatives  to  the  BEA’s  National  Income  and 
Product  Accounts.  This  article  discusses  five of these. 
United Nations  System of National  Accounts 
KJNSNA) 
This  system  of accounts  is used  for cross-country 
comparisons  in  ah  United  Nations  and  OECD 
publications.  It  is fairly  similar  to  the  NIPA  except 
in  its  treatment  of  government  investment,  where 
the  UNSNA  defines  nonmihtary  government  con- 
struction  and  equipment  purchases  as  investment 
while  the  NIPA  does  not.  The  U.S.  provides  national 
economic  data to the  UN  and the  OECD  in UNSNA 
form,  so  the  information  is  readily  available  to  in- 
terested  parties. 
The  Flow-of-Funds  Accounts  (FFA) 
Flow-of-funds  estimates  are  published  quarterly 
by  the  Federal  Reserve  Board.  The  FFA  measure 
saving  differently  from  the  way  it is calculated  for the 
NIPA,  thus  providing  a readily  available  alternative 
source  of  estimates  of  national  saving.  The  FFA 
system  also  differs  from  the  NIPA  in  that  net  pur- 
chases  of  consumer  durables  are  considered  to  be 
investment  and  the  funds  used  to purchase  them  to 
be  saving. 
Saving  in the  FFA  is figured  in the  following  way. 
Individuals’  saving is defined  as the  sum  of individuals’ 
increases  in financial  assets6  and  tangible  assets’  less 
their  net  increase  in  debt,*  both  terms  excluding 
the  effects  of  asset  revaluation.  Saving  so  mea- 
sured  differs  in concept  from  NIPA  personal  saving 
mainly  because  it includes:  (1) Government  insurance 
6 Fiicial  assexs in this  context  inchrde  checkable  deposits,  time 
and  savings  deposits,  money  market  fund  shares,  U.S.  Treasury 
securities,  U.S.  Government  agency  securities,  tax-exempt 
obligations,  corporate  and  foreign  bonds,  open-market  paper, 
mutual  fund  shares,  other  corporate  equities,  private  life insurance 
reserves,  private  insured  pension  reserves,  private  noninsured 
pension  reserves,  Government  insurance  and  pension  reserves, 
and  miscellaneous  financial  assets. 
7 Tangible  assets  include  owner-occupied  homes,  other  fixed 
assefs (indutling corporate farms),  consumer iiurables, and 
inventories  (also  includes  corporate  farms). 
* Indiiiduals’  debt  includes  mortgage  debt  on nonfarm houses, 
other  mortgage  debt  (mcludes  corporate  farm),  CollsUmer Credit, 
security  credit,  policy  loans,  and  other  debt  (includes  corporate 
farms). 
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durables;  (3)  capital  gains  dividends  from  mutual 
funds,  and  (4)  net  saving  by  farm  corporations.  In 
addition,  the  two  measures  of saving  differ  because 
of  measurement  differences,  by  an  amount  that  is 
called  the  “household  discrepancy.“9 
Hendershott-Peek  Adjustments 
Panic  Hendershott  and Joe  Peek  [lo]  adjusted  the 
NIPA  accounts  to  move  the  measurement  of  U.S. 
private  saving  closer  to  the  concept  of  saving  as  a 
change  in real  wealth.  Such  a concept  viewed  sav- 
ing  as  the  difference  between  end-  and  beginning- 
of-period  net  worth  (revalued  to  current  prices).  So 
defined,  saving is equal to the change  in real resources 
available  for  future  consumption. 
The  Hendershott-Peek  concept  of saving is similar 
to  that  used  in the  FFA  accounts.  Indeed,  Hender- 
shott  and  Peek  utilize  FFA  accounts  quite  liberally 
in  making  their  adjustments  to  NIPA  savings  and 
investment.  Beginning  with  the  NIPA  estimates  of 
personal  saving  and  investment,  Hendershott  and 
Peek,  consistent  with  the  FFA  accounts,  added  net 
purchases  of  durable  goods  by  consumers,  sole 
proprietorships,  and  partnerships  as well  as net  pur- 
chases  of  government  life  insurance  and  pension 
reserves.rO  They  also  added  OASI  contributions, 
which  are  not  defined  as  saving  in  the  FFA.11 
Defining  social  security  contributions  as  part  of 
personal  saving  is controversial.  The  debate  centers 
on whether  social security  “contributions”  differ from 
ordinary  taxes.12 The  answer  depends  upon  whether 
the  expectation  of  receiving  future  social  security 
benefits  affects  current  consumption  spending.  If, for 
example,  individuals  discount  future  social  security 
benefits  as  illusory  and  therefore  continue  to  save 
whatever  amount  they  would  have  saved  anyway, 
9 See  Wilson,  Freund,  Yohn,  and  Lederer  [Z?] for  a  detailed 
analysis  of  the  “household  discrepancy.” 
r” A  dollar  of income  put  into  a private  retirement  plan  is con- 
sidered  to  be  a dollar  of income  saved,  and  a dollar  of interest 
earned  on  those  private  retirement  funds  and  not  consumed  is 
also  considered  to  be  a  dollar  saved. 
I* Hendershott  and  Peek  froze. the  amount  of the  social  secur- 
ity  contribution  to  be  added  in  1981-85  at the  1980  real  level. 
They  argued  that  the  promised  rate  of return  on  social  security 
began  to  fall short  of  the  market  rate  in  the  early  eighties,  so 
individuals  would  not  have  increased  their  contributions  volun- 
tarily  after  that  time. 
r2 They  are  treated  as  ordinary  taxes  in  the  NIPA. 
social  ‘security  payments  should  not  be  defined  as 
saving.  l3 
Hendershott  and  Peek  also adjust  saving to remove 
the  inflation  premium  from  interest  income.  This 
adjustment  also  makes  sense  theoretically;  from  the 
change-in-net-worth  approach  to  saving,  it  is  clear 
that  a  portion  of  interest  payments  in  inflationary 
periods  merely  compensate  for a decline  in the  real 
value  of dollar-denominated  assets.  The  mechanics 
of  HP’s  actual  adjustment  procedure  was  criticized 
severely  by  de  Leeuw,  l4  however,  and  it  needs 
rethinking. 
In  any  event,  despite  de  Leeuw’s  criticisms,  the 
Hendershott-Peek  adjustments  deserve  serious  con- 
sideration  both  as criticisms  of the  conventional  ac- 
counts  and  as  proposals  for  future  change  in  the 
NIPA. 
The  Total  Incomes  System of Accounts 
CTISA) 
Robert  Eisner  [6]  has  developed  an  extended 
system  of accounts  that  he  calls  the  Total  Incomes 
System  of  Accounts  (TISA).  His  system  is  based 
upon  the  assumption  that  there  is a need  for  “.  .  . 
better  measures  of economic  activity  contributing  to 
social  welfare,  more  inclusive  and relevant  measures 
of  capital  formation  and  other  factors  of  economic 
growth,  and  better  and/or  additional  data  to  fit con- 
cepts  of consumption,  investment  and  production.” 
(6,  p.21  Eisner’s  system  retains,the  NIPA’s  central 
focus  on the  measurement  of final product,  but TISA 
defines  final  product  differently  than  the  NIPA. 
The  TISA  system  is designed  to “. . . include  the 
income  corresponding  to alI consumption  and  capital 
1s The  specific  HP  adjustments  for  social  security  have  been 
criticized.  Frank  de  Leeuw,  in a commentary,  argued  as follows: 
“It would  seem  . . . that  adjusting  the  present  [NIPA]  estimates 
to  a change-in-wealth  approach  would  require  adding  contribu- 
tions  to  personal  saving  and  subtracting  benefit  payments. 
.  .  .  HP’s  adjustments  do  add  contributions  .  .  .  but  they  do 
not  subtract  benefit  payments.  .  .  .  This  procedure  has  the 
peculiar  consequence  that,  if contributions  and  benefits  rise  by 
identical  amounts  .  . . personal  saving  rises.”  [lo,  pp.  224-251 
The  de  Leeuw  criticism  of the  HP  social  security  adjustment 
seems  appropriate.  One  can,  however,  accept  the  argument  that 
social  security  contributions  are  saving  and  easily  make  the 
straightforward  adjustment  suggested  by de Leeuw  of including 
social  security  contributions  in  personal  saving  and  excluding 
benefits.  This  adjustment  may  be  made  to NIPA  personal  sav- 
ing simply  by adding  the  social  security  surplus,  because  NIPA 
personal  saving  already  includes  social  security  benefit  payments. 
r4 Particularly  their  assumption  that  the  average  real interest  rate 
was  constant  (equal  to  the  nominal  rate  in  1950)  from  1950 
through  1980. 
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of the  economy.”  [6, p.  211 Eisner’s  TISA  accounts 
thus  include  items  of  nonmarket  product  such  as 
“ . . . the  services  of government,  household  capital, 
unpaid  household  labor,  and  the  opportunity  costs 
of  students’  time.”  [6,  p.  211 
Eisner  classifies national  defense,  roads,  and  police 
services  as intermediate  product,  while  redefining  a 
portion  of commercial  television,  radio,  newspaper, 
and  magazine  services  as final product.  He. also  sub- 
tracts  expenses  related  to  work  from  income  and 
product  and  adds  the  value  of  employee  training 
and  human  capital  formation  to income  and product. 
Also,  business  product  is reduced  by  the  amount  of 
intermediate  product  deemed  to  be  received  by 
government. 
The  Total  Incomes  System  of Accounts  also  in- 
cludes  as output  the  value  of government  subsides, 
the  deficits  of government  enterprises,  the  services 
of volunteer  labor,  and  the  “. . . differences  between 
opportunity  costs  of military  conscripts  and jurors  and 
what  they  are  paid.”  16, p.211 
The  TISA  measure  of  capital  accumulation  in- 
cludes  NIPA’s  gross  private  domestic  investment, 
plus  (1) governmental  acquisitions  of structures  and 
equipment  and  additions  to  inventory  ($125  billion 
in  1981),  (2) household  acquisitions  of durable  goods 
and  additions  to  inventory  ($351  billion  in  1981), 
and  (3)  investment  in intangible  capital  in the  form 
of research  and  development,  education  and  train- 
ing,  and  health  ($850  billion  in  1981).  As  a  result 
of these  changes,  the  TISA  gross  national  product 
was  estimated  to  have  been  54.4  percent  larger  than 
NIPA  GNP  in  198 1, while  TISA  saving  and  invest- 
ment  measures  were  over  three  times  larger  than  the 
NIPA  measures. 
TISA  also provides  estimates,  as a supplement  to 
conventional  capital accumulation,  of net  revaluations 
of tangible  asset@  ($-  153.7  billion  in  1981).  TISA 
thus  equates  current  dollar net  investment  to the  cur- 
rent  dollar  value  of  the  real  change  in  net  worth, 
whether  due  to acquisition  of newly  produced  capital 
or  to  changes  in  the  value  of  existing  capital. 
Jorgenson-Fraumeni,  Full National  Product 
Dale  Jorgenson  and  Barbara  Fraumeni  [l 11 have 
developed  a system  of  national  accounting  that  in- 
15  Net  revaluations  measure  the  changes  in the  nominal  values 
of  tangible  assets  less  changes  attributable  to  general  price 
movements. 
eludes  investment  in  human  and  nonhuman 
capital,and  consumption  of  market  and  nonmarket 
goods  a&services.  According  to  Jorgenson  and 
Fraumeni  (IF),  the  NIPA  understates  the  amount  of 
economic  activity  in the  U.S.  by  a very  substantial 
amount,  primarily  because  nonmarket  activities  are 
excluded. 
The  JF  measure  of capital  formation  puts  invest- 
ment  in  human  capital  at  least  four  times  the 
magnitude  of  investment  in  nonhuman  capital. 
Thus,  the  JF  national  accounts  assign  a much  larger 
relative  importance  to  investment  than  the  NIPA. 
“FulI”  investment  in  the  JF  system,  where  both 
human  and  nonhuman  capital  are  included,  con- 
stitutes  around  half  of  “full”  product.  “Full”  con- 
sumption  makes  up the-other  half.  The  value  of full 
product  equals  the  value  of outlays  on  the  services 
of human  and nonhuman  capital,  which  take  the  form 
of  both  market  and  nonmarket  labor  and  property 
compensation. 
Labor  compensation  is  about  90  percent  of  the 
total  factor  outlay,  and  nonmarket  labor  compensa- 
tion,  which  includes  investment  in  education, 
household  production,  and  leisure  time,  accounts  for 
more  than  80  percent  of  labor  compensation.  The 
JF  system  assumes  that  both  labor and property  com- 
pensation  are measured  after  taxes  are deducted  and 
subsidies  accruing  to  individuals  are  added. 
Consistent  with  the  inclusion  of  gross  human 
capital  in the  JF  accounts,  JF  estimate  the  depreci- 
ation  of human  capital.  Depreciation  of human  capital 
is  defined  as  the  sum  of  changes  in  lifetime  labor 
incomes  that  occur  with  age  for  all individuals  who 
remain  in the  population,  and  lifetime  labor  incomes 
of all individuals  who  die  or emigrate.  Depreciation 
of  nonhuman  capital  is  the  sum  of  changes,  in  the 
current  year,  of asset  values  for all investment  goods 
remaining  in  the  capital  stock  and  the  asset  values 
of  all  investment  goods  that  are  retired  from  the 
capital  stock. 
As  a result  of  all of these  adjustments,  JF’s  “full” 
investment  is substantially  larger  than  Gross  Private 
Domestic  Investment  as  reported  in  the  NIPA.  In 
1984,  for  example,  JF  estimated  “full”  investment 
to be $6.15  trillion,  of which  $5.12  trillion was human 
investment  and  $1.03  trillion  was  nonhuman  invest- 
ment.  NIPA  gross  private  domestic  investment  was 
estimated  to  be  $0.66  trillion.  As  in  the  NIPA, 
Jorgenson-Fraumeni  full investment  equals JF full sav- 
ing,  except  for  statistical  discrepancy.  Also,  full 
human  capital  equals  full  human  saving. 
26  ECONOMIC  REVIEW.  MAY/JUNE  1990 Chart 4 
V. 
COMPARISON  OF SYSTEMS  OF 
NATIONAL  ACCOUNTS: 
THE  HISTORICAL RECORD 
UNSNA  Versus  NJPA 
Chart  3  shows  UNSNA  gross  and  net  savings 
ratesI  in comparison  to  NIPA  gross  and  net  saving 
rates.  As the  chart  shows, UNSNA  savings rates were 
consistently  larger  than  NIPA  rates,  which  is to  be 
expected  because  saving  in the  UNSNA  system  in- 
cludes  funds  to  be  used  for  government  capital 
spending.  UNSNA  net saving does  show a downward 
trend  after  1973,  but  its downward  movement  is con- 
siderably  more  moderate  than  the  trend  in ‘NIPA net 
’  saving.  UNSNA  net  saving  averaged  7.9  percent  of 
net  domestic  product  in the  1970-83  period  and 6.6 
percent  of NDP  in 1984-88.  NIPA  net saving, in con- 
trast,  averaged  8.0  percent  of  net  national  product 
in  1970-83  and  2.6  percent  of  NNP  in  1984-88. 
Flow-of-Feds  Versus  NIPA 
Chart  4  shows  individuals’  saving  from  the  flow- 
of-funds  accounts  (FFA)  and  the  reconcilement  of 
the  FFA  and  NIPA  personal  saving  rates  over  the 
1952-89  time  period.  All three  are  plotted  as per- 
centagesof  NNP.  The  comparison  shows,  first,  rhat 
FFA  personal  savings rates,  even  after  reconciliation, 
I6 As  percentages  of  gross  damestic  product  (GDP)  and  net 
domestic  product  (NDP).  GDP  is the  market  value  of output 
produced  by factors pf production  Win  a country,  while GNP 
is the  market  value  of output  produced  by factors  of production 
owned by  citizens  of  a country. 
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remain  generally  higher  than  NIPA  personal  savings 
rates,  and second,  that  FFA  individuals’ savings rates 
have  shown  no  downward  trend  in  recent  years. 
The  differences  between  individuals’  savings rates 
and  personal  savings  rates17  are  quite  striking. 
Thus,  although  the  point  is valid  that  U.S.  savings 
rates  as measured  by the National  Income  and  Prod- 
uct  Accounts  have  declined  in  recent  .years,  ‘in- 
dividuals’  savings  rates,  as derived  from  the  flow-of- 
funds  accounts,  do  not  show  similar  declines. 
The -Hendershott-Peek Adjustments 
Versus  NIPA 
The  estimates  of  net  private  saving  rates  as 
adjusted  by  Hendershott  and  Peek  (with  minor 
modificationsl*)  are  shown  in  Chart  5  in  com- 
parison  to  NIPA  net  private  savings.  Both  rates  are 
percentages  of ,Net  National  Product.  As the  chart 
shows,  the  HP  saving  rate  is almost  twice  as large 
as  the  NIPA  rate.  In  the  1960-81  period;  for  ex- 
ample,  the  HP  rate  averaged‘142  percent  of .NNP, 
while  the  NIPA  rate  averaged  only  8.7  percent. 
I7 The  major  differences  between  individuals’  saving  and  per- 
sonal  saving  are  that  the  former  includes  net  investment  in 
consumer  durables  and  government  insurance  and  pension 
reserves.  MPA  Personal  Income  and FFA  Personal  Income  differ 
by  the  amount  of  the  household  discrepancy.  See  discussion 
above,  Section  IV. 
** Because  of  de  L.eeuw’s  criticism,  HPs  adjustment  for  the 
inflation premium  in interest  income  was not made.  Also because 
of  de  Leeuw,  the  actual  HP  adjustment  ,for  social  security 
contributions  was  modified.  Following  his suggestion  (see  foot- 
note  13),  the  social  security  modification  was’made  by  adding 
the  social  security  surplus  to  personal  saving. 
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The  decline  of  private  saving  in  recent  years  is 
considerably  less  severe  when  saving  is  measured 
with  the  HP  adjustments.  While  the  average  NIPA 
saving  rate  fell  2.0  percentage  points  between  the 
1960-81  and  the  1982-85  periods,  the  average  HP 
saving  rate  fell  only  0.7  percentage  points.  The 
major  reason  for  the  more  moderate  decline  in  the 
HP  savings  rate  is that  HP  personal  saving  includes 
the  social  security  surplus. 
TISA  Versus  NIPA 
Chart  6  shows  TISA  gross  and  net  saving  as 
percents  of  TISA  GNP  and  NNP  as  well  as  net 
investment  & intangible  capital  as a percent  of TISA 
net  national  product  over  the  1950-1980  period. 
NIPA  net  saving  as a percent  of NNP  is, shown  for 
comparison.  As  the  chart  illustrates,  TISA  savings 
rates  substantially  exceed  NIPA  savings  rates.  In fact, 
in  198 1, TISA  net  investment  in  intangible  ,capital 
alone  (as  a percent  of  TISA  NNP)  was  more  than 
twice  as large  as NIPA  net  investment  (as a percent 
of  NIPA  NNP).  Moreover,  TISA  saving  over  the 
1950-80  period  shows  no obvious  overall  downward 
trend.  Net  investment  in intangibles  seems  to  have 
peaked  in  1972  and  has  since  moved  downward,  but 
its  1981  level  was  well  above  the  levels  of  the 
fifties. 
Jorgenson-Fraumeni  Versus  NIPA 
Chart  7 shows  Jorgenson  and  Fraumeni’s  full gross 
and  net  investment  as  percentages  of  the  corre- 
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.sponding  estimates  of  full  private  GNP  and  NNP. 
Net  human  capital  investment  is  also  plotted  as  a 
percentage  of full private  NNP.  The  chart  shows  that 
full  gross  investment  declined  only  about  five  per- 
centage  points  from  its  1970  peak  to  1984.  Full  net 
investment,  on  the  other  hand,  fell  almost  ten  per- 
centage  points.  The  difference,  which  is deprecia- 
tion,  is mainly  in the  depreciation  of human  capital, 
as  is  shown  in  Chart  8. 
Chart  7 
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Source:  Jorgenson  and  Fraumeni.  “Lifetime Income and  Human Capital,” 
unpublished  preliminary  manuscript,  August  1966. 
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All  Systems Compared 
Chart  9  shows  a comparison  of net  savings  rates 
calculated  from  the  NIPA,  Jorgenson  and  Fraumeni, 
TISA,  and  Hendershott  and  Peek.  As  the  chart 
shows  clearly,  the  JF  savings  rates  tower  over  the 
other  rates.  The  TISA  rates  are next  largest,  followed 
by  the  Hendershott-Peek  and  flow-of-funds 
estimates.  Lowest,  and  substantially  below  the  flow- 
of-funds  estimates,  comes  the  NIPA. 
VI. 
INTERIM  CONCLUSIONS 
AND OBSERVATIONS 
Which  system  is best?  Strong  cases  can  be  made 
for  all of  them.  It  seems  especially  clear,  however, 
that  if one  is using  the  rate  of saving  as an indicator 
of  the  future  rate  of  national  economic  growth  (as 
do  Feldstein  and  Rukeyser),  it is not  appropriate  to 
exclude  from  saving  funds  used  to  finance  in- 
vestments  in human  capital,  research  and  develop- 
ment,  and  the  public  infrastructure. 
Moses  Abramovitz  believes  investments  in infra- 
structure  and  human  capital  to  be  key  factors  in ex- 
plaining  cross-country  differences  in  economic 
growth.  As  he  puts  it: 
Social  capability  is  what  separates  less  developed  from 
advanced  countries  today  and  which,  in  the  past,  sepa- 
rated  the  lare-comers  among  the  countries  that  are  now 
industrialized  from  the  early  entrants  into  what  Kuznets 
called  ‘modern  economic  growth.’  .  .  .  [S]ocial  capability 
.  .  . refers  to  a country’s  political  institutions,  its  political 
NET  SAVINGS  RATES  COMPARED 
(selected  pars) 





2’-6-,g  5 
,~~~~15.3~15.~~‘5.~ 
‘12.8 
9.9  10.9 
9.4-  1 
-9.4  -9.9-10.2-g.* 
Flow of  Funds  Accounts 
\7.1\ 
NIPA  5’4 
-5.5 
I  I  I  I  I 
1956  1966  1971  1976  1961 
integration  and  the  effective  consensus  in favor  of develop- 
ment.  These  [attributes  affect]  .  .  .  (1)  the  ranking  of 
economic  activity  and  of  material  welfare  in  the  scale  of 
social  values,  (2) the  social  sanctions  that  protect  earnings, 
propertj  and  honest  trade,  and  (3)  the  willingness  and 
capacity  of governments  to create  the  physical  infrastructure 
for  private  activity.  Next,  there  is  a  country’s  technical 
competence  for which,  af least  among  Western  countries, 
years  of  schooling  may  be  a  good  proxy.  11, p.31 
Of the five alternative  systems  of national  accounts, 
the  saving  and  investment  estimates  from  the 
UNSNA,  flow-of-funds  accounts,  and  the 
Hendershott-Peek  system  depart  the  least  from  the 
U.S.  national  income  and product  accounts.  Do  they 
indicate  a  savings  slowdown? 
The  UNSNA-based  saving  rate  had  only  a 
moderate  decline  between  1970-83  and  1984-88. 
Individuals’  saving  as measured  by  the  flow-of-funds 
accounts  showed  no  observable  trend  toward  lower 
savings rates.  Consistently,  the  HPadjusted  accounts 
indicated  considerably  higher  saving and  considerably 
less  of a decline  in  the  savings  rate  since  the  mid- 
seventies  than  did  the  NIPA.  The  least  controver- 
sial systems,  therefore,  provide  no evidence  that  the 
U.S.  is  in  a  “saving  crisis.” 
Only  the  Jorgenson-Fraumeni  estimates  of  net 
investment  seem  to be consistent  with  the  existence 
of some  sort of a U.S.  saving crisis. But the post-1971 
decline  in the  JF  net  investment  rate  is attributable 
to a declining  rate of /unman capital spending,  and that 
in  turn  is  attributable  to  a  rapid  rise  in  human 
depreciation  since  197 1. If the  JF  data  describe  the 
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different  in  character  from  that  envisioned  by 
Rukeyser  and  Feldstein,  et af. 
VII. 
U.S.  SAVING RELATNETo  SAVJNGIN 
t?WJ3R  INDUSTilIAL cOUNTRiES20 
This  section  of the  article  will review  five different 
analyses  of U.S.  savings  rates  compared  to  savings 
rates  in other  advanced  countries.  Robert  Lipsey  and 
Irving  Kravis  [ 12,  131 have  argued  persuasively  that 
although  the  United  States  currently  is not  a leader 
in saving  among  the  major  industrialized  countries, 
much  of the  concern  that  the  country  is improvident 
is based  upon  a misinterpretation  of the  data.  Mincer 
and  H&hi’s  study  of  on-the-job  training  in  the 
United  States  and Japan  [ 151, however,  raises  ques- 
tions  about  Lipsey  and  Kravis’s favorable  conclusions, 
at least  those  relating  to the  relative  levels  of human 
capital  investment  in  the  United  States  and  Japan. 
Fumio  Hayashi  [8,  91, on  the  other  hand,  reaches 
the  conclusion  that  the  difference  between  the  U.S. 
and  the  Japanese  savings  rate  is  substantially 
overstated  because  of  noncomparabilities  in  the 
definition  of  the  national  income  and  product  ac- 
counts  in  the  two  countries. 
Robert  McCauley  and  Steven  Zimmer  [ 141 
examine  differences  in  investment  spending  in  the 
United  States,  Britain,  Japan,  and  Germany.  They 
conclude  that  the  cost  of capital  in Japan  and  Ger- 
many  was  lower  than  in the  United  States  and  the 
United  Kingdom,  and then  argue  that  this higher  cost 
of capital  may  explain  the  consistently  lagging invest- 
ment  spending  in  the  latter  two  countries. 
David  Aschauer  [Z] argues  that  a relatively  low rate 
of public  (governmental)  investment  spending  in the 
United  States  can  also  explain  some  of  its  lagging 
investment  and  slower  productivity  growth. 
Is the U.S.  a Spendthrift Nation? 
Lipsey  and  Kravis  discuss  the  items  that  should 
be  included  in saving  and  investmenP  and  develop 
19  As  the  rise  in  human  depreciation  after  1971  stemmed  from 
the  use  of the  life-cycle  approach  to estimating  depreciation  com- 
bined  with  the  baby  boom’s  effects  on  the  age  distribution  of 
the  population,  the  decline  in JF  net  investmenr  may  be  more 
of a measurement  anomaly  than  a piece  of reliable  evidence  of 
a  saving  crisis. 
*a Particularly  the  “Group  of  Seven”  countries,  which  include 
Canada,  France,  West  Germany,  Italy,  Japan,  the  United 
Kingdom,  and  the  United  States. 
z1 Lipsey  and  Kravis  use gross  saving  and  investment  throughout 
because  they  are skeptical  of cross-country  comparisons  of capitai 
consumption  measures. 
a set  of adjustments  to incorporate  spending  for con- 
sumer  dun&es,  education,  and research  and develop 
ment  into  the  investment  accounts.  The  effects  of 
these  adjustments  on cross-country  savings  rates  are 
given  in Table  I. As is shown  in the  table,  when  all 
of the  adjustments  are made,  the  difference  between 
the  U.S.  rate  of  capital  formation  and  that  of  the 
average  of the  rest  of the  Group  of Seven  countries 
is reduced  from  4.7  percentage  points  to  3.3  percen- 
tage  points.z2 
Lipsey  and  Kravis  discussed  further  adjustments 
that  would  be  desirable  if they  were  not  precluded 
by  data  unavailability.  One  particularly  important 
additional  adjustment  would  have  been  to include  in 
saving  and  investment  the  foregone  earnings  of 
students.  As  Lipsey  and  Kravis  state,  “As  the  pro- 
portion  of working-age  students  attending  institutions 
of higher  education  is higher  in the  United  States  than 
in  all or  most  of  the  other  countries,  the  inclusion 
of their  foregone  earnings  in the  form  of investment 
would  raise  the  U.S.  investment  rate  and  bring  it 
closer  to  the  average.”  [13,  p.  73) 
ra Lipsey  and  Kravis  also  make  an  adjustment  for  differences 
in military  capital  formation,  which  further  reduces  the  differential 
to  about  3.1  percentage  points. 
Table  I 
Gross Fixed  Capital  Formation 
as  a  percent  of  Gross  Domestic  Product 
average  of  individual  year  ratios,  1970-1984 
Conventional Measure 
+  Education 
United  States  18.1 
Canada  22.0 
Japan  31.9 
France  22.2 
Germany  22.1 
Italy  19.8 
United  Kingdom  18.5 
Average-US  excluded  22.8 
a 1970-1983 
b 1970-1982 
+  Research  & 
Development 
+  Consumer 
Durables 
I 
24.2  26.2  30.1 
30.9  31.9  37.2 
36.1  38.0”  39.9” 
25.9  27.5  32.4 
26.0”  27.9”  NA 
24.gb  25.7b  29.0b 
23.0  24.9”  28.4” 
27.8  29.3  33.4 
Source:  Lipsey and  Kravis, 112,  pp.  47-501 
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are  cheaper  relative  to  other  goods  in the  U.S.  than 
they  are  in many  other  countries.  As  a result,  even 
with  higher  savings  rates,  investors  in  those  other 
countries  can not purchase  as many  investment  goods 
as  can  investors  in  the  United  States. 
Finally,  Lipsey  and Kravis  consider  a criticism  that 
the  U.S.  funnels  excessively  large  shares  of  its 
saving  into  residential  construction  and  consumer 
durables,  while  other  countries  channel  their  saving 
into  more  productive  forms  of investment,  such  as 
machinery  and  equipment.  They  conclude  that 
“ .  .  . the  share  of capital  formation  going  into  resi- 
dential  building  has  not  been  exceptionally  high  in 
the  United  States.23  .  .  .  [Also],  the  share  of  pro- 
ducer  durables  . . . in conventional  capital  formation 
was  above  average  in the  U.S.”  [13,  pp.  41-Z]  This 
view  is shared  by  Tatom  [‘ZO),  who  has  argued  that 
U.S.  investment  in  equipment  in  the  eighties  was 
quite  strong,  especially  in the  first half of the  decade. 
Can  On-the-Job Training  be Ignored? 
Lipsey  and  Kravis’s  conclusion  about  the  narrow- 
ing  of  the  differential  between  the  U.S.  and  the 
Japanese  savings  rates  after  adjustment  for  human 
capital  investment  might  well  have  been  reversed  if 
their  study  had  included  on-the-job  training.  Jacob 
Mincer  and  Yoshio  Higuchi  [  151 recently  reported 
the  results  of a massive  study  of differences  in train- 
ing  in  Japan  and  the  United  States  that  used 
microdata  from  the  Panel  Studies  of  Income 
Dynamics  for the  United  States,  and  microdata  from 
the  “Employment  Structure  Survey”  for  Japan. 
The  Mincer  and  Higuchi  study  began  with  two 
observations:  (1) that  workers  in Japanese  firms  have 
lower  turnover  rates  than  workers  in U.S.  firms  and 
(2) that  wages  of workers  in Japanese  firms ‘tended 
to  rise  more  rapidly  with  years  of  tenure  than  did 
wages  of workers  in U.S.  firms.  They  then  showed 
that  lower  worker  turnover  rates  were  not  cultural 
traits  peculiar  to  Japanese  workers,  noting  that  the 
very  low  turnover  rates  in  Japan  are  postwar 
phenomena,  and  that  turnover  rates  and  wage  pro- 
files for American  workers  in Japanese  plants  located 
in the  United  States  were  similar to those  of Japanese 
workers  in Japan.  Both  the  lower  turnover  rates  and 
the  higher  wage  profiles,  they  argued,  stemmed  from 
Japanese  firms’  on-the-job  training  programs. 
23  Seven  of  fourteen  countries  studied  (Belgium,  Denmark, 
Finland,  France,  Germany,  and  Italy)  had  higher  shares  over 
1960-1984. 
Mincer  and  Higuchi  then  argued  persuasively  that 
the  more  intensive  formation  of human  capital on the 
job  in  Japanese  firms  resulted  from  those  firms 
being  forced  to  cope  with  rapid  technological  change 
in the  post-World  War  II period.  They  reached  that 
conclusion  for  the  following  reasons: 
(i)  There  were  strong  reductions  in  turnover  during  the 
1950s.  when  economic  growth  accelerated.  . . . (ii) There 
was  a  lack  of  deceleration  in  the  wage  profde  of  mature 
workers  relative  to  younger  workers  in Japan-suggesting 
continuous  training  and  retraining  processes  characteristic 
of  rapid  technological change. (ii)  There  were larger 
declines  in wages  of workers  in  Japan  who  interrupted  their 
labor  force  participation  for  several  year  periods  than  in 
the  wages  of  comparable  U.S.  workers.  [15,  p.  1241 
Finally,  they  observed  that  research  using  U.S.  data 
also  suggested  that  the  more  rapid  the  productivity 
growth  in  an  industry,  the  greater  the  demand  for 
education  and  training. 
The  Mincer-Higuchi  study,  therefore,  has  rather 
disturbing  implications  about  the  future  prospects  of 
the  U.S.  economy  relative  to  those  of the  Japanese 
economy.  Even  if Lipsey  and  Kravis  are  correct  in 
arguing  that  the  U.S.  invests  more  of  its  GNP  in 
education  than  does Japan,  the Mincer-Higuchi  study 
implies  that  the  U.S.  expenditures  may  not  be  as 
efficient  in  forming  usable  human  capital  and  pro- 
moting  productivity  growth. 
!s  Japan’s Savings Rate High? 
Fumio  Hayashi  shows  that  the  Japanese  national 
accounts  value  depreciation  at historical  cost,  while 
it is valued  at replacement  cost  in the  U.S.  national 
accounts.  Relative  to  the  U.S.,  therefore,  Japanese 
saving  is overstated  by  the  amount  of the  difference 
between  depreciation  at historical  cost  and  deprecia- 
tion  at replacement  cost.  He  also notes  that  the  U.S. 
national  income  accounts  fail to  recognize  govern- 
ment  capital  formation,  while  the Japanese  accounts, 
following  the  UNSNA,  do. 
Hayashi  reconciles  the  U.S.  and Japanese  accounts 
by  changing  the  Japanese  depreciation  data  to  a 
replacement  cost  basis  and  by  making  Japanese 
government  saving  correspond  to  the  NIPA  defini- 
tion  of U.S.  government  saving.  These  adjustments 
make  a very  large  difference  in the  Japanese  saving 
rate. 
Chart  10,  which  is taken  directly  from  Hayashi’s 
article,  illustrates  the  difference  in  the  unadjusted 
and  adjusted  savings  rates  for Japan.  It  shows  that, 
adjusted  for  -accounting  differences,  the  national 
saving  rate  in Japan  rose  substantially  from  1955  to 
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1970  but  after  that  time  it began  to  decline,  fmally 
converging  with  the  U.S.  rate  by  the  late  1970s.  As 
Hayashi  states: 
To  people  unaware  of  the  differences  in  national  income 
accounting,  the  discrepancy  between  Japan’s  unadjusted 
saving  rate  and  the  U.S.  rate  appears  quite  substantial- 
even  ominous.  But  by  now  it should  be  clear  that  most  of 
the  apparent  discrepancy  is  due  to  accounting  differences 
between  the  two  countries.  [S,  p.  51 
Hayashi  concluded  that  “the  phenomenon  of high 
Japanese  saving  rate  is  limited  to  the  period  of 
1965-1975”  (9, p.  71. Japan’s  relatively  high  savings 
rates  in that  ten-year  period  presumably  came  about 
in response  to Japan’s  efforts  to reconstruct  its capital 
stock,  which  had  been  severely  damaged  in  World 
war  II. 
As  the  chart  shows  clearly,  however,  after  1980 
the  adjusted  savings  rate  for Japan  began  to rise again 
while  the  U.S.  saving  rate  continued  to fall. Hayashi 
discounts  the  divergence  in  the  rates  since  1980, 
however,  arguing  that  since  Japan’s  reconstruction 
was  completed  in the  early  198Os,  the  Japanese  and 
U.S.  savings  rates  should  converge  in the  future.24 
This  prediction  is  debatable. 
z4 To  explain  the  diver&nce  in savings  rates  since  1983,  Hayashi 
offers  two  competing  explanations.  The  first  is  that,  owing  to 
the  U.S.  dollar’s  post-1983  depreciation  against  the  Yen,  the 
Japanese  have  been  saving  more  to  offset  capital  losses  and 
diminished  rates  of return  on  their  holdings  of U.S.  bonds.  This 
explanation  assumes  that  the  Japanese  kish  ,to maintain  a con- 
stant  wealth-to-income  ratio.  The  second  explanation  is that  the 
divergence  stems  from  differences  in the  two  countries’  budget 
policies. 
Lawrence  Christian0  [4]  examined  the  analysis 
underlying  the  Hayashi  “reconstruction”  hypothesis 
in an  article  immediately  following  Hayashi’s  in the 
Federal  Reserve  Bank  qf  Minneapolis’s  QNZ~,Q&~ 
R&.  He  concluded  that  the  Hayashi  hypothesis, 
with  its  implications  about  the  future  convergence 
of savings  rates  in the  U.S.  and  Japan,  was  not  im- 
plausible,  but he argued  that further  verification  would 
be  required  before  it  could  be  accepted. 
Costs  of Capital as Determinants  of 
Investment Spending 
McCauley  and Zmmer,  as noted  earlier,  found  that 
the  cost  of capital  was  lower  in Japan  and  Germany 
than  it  was  in  the  United  States  and  the  United 
Kingdom.  They  investigated,  and  subsdquently  re- 
jetted,  differences  in  income  tax  structures  as  im- 
portant  determinants  of  the  relatively  low  cost  of 
capital  in Japan  and Germany.  Rather,  they  attributed 
the  “cost  of  capital  gap”  to  two  basic  factors:  (1) 
Japanese  and  German  households  are  thriftier;  and 
(2) the  Japanese  and  German  economies  face  lower 
risk from  economic  instability.  These  two  factors  will 
be  examined  in  turn. 
Chart  11  demonstrates  the  differences  in  thrifti- 
ness.  Household  saving  amounted  to  about  17 per- 
cent  of disposable  income  in Japan  and  13 percent 
in  Germany  in  1988,  but  only  about  4  percent  of 
disposable  income  in the  U.S.  McCauley  and  Zim- 
mer  attribute  much  of the  cross-country  difference 
in  thriftiness  to  cross-country  differences  in  the 
availability  of  consumer  credit. 
Chart  12 demonstrates  the differences  in household 
debt  as a share  of disposable  income  across  the  four 
countries.  This  chart  shows  a much  higher  (though 
narrowing)  use  of credit  in  the  U.S.  and  U.K.  than 
in Japan  and  Germany.  McCauley  and  Zimmer  cite 
a report  by the  President’s  Commission  on Industrial 
Competitiveness  that  “.  . . juxtaposed  ‘low interest 
rates  on  business  debt’  in  Japan  with  a  two-tier, 
regulated  rate  structure  in  which  interest  rates  are 
far higher  on consumer  loans than  on business  loans.” 
[ 14,  p.  18) They  conclude  that  “.  .  . the  Japanese 
and  German  financial  systems  formerly  did not  pump 
much  credit  to  consumers  but  now  circulate  credit 
more  evenly,  though  American  and British consumers 
may  still  enjoy  a  stronger  flow.”  (14,  p.  181 
McCauley  and Zimmer  also attribute  the  lower  cost 
of capital  in Japan  and  Germany  to more  stable  rates 
of GNP  growth  (particularly  in Japan)  and lower  rates 
of  inflation.  They  argue  that  as  a  result  of  this 
32  ECONOMIC  REVIEW.  MAY/JUNE  1990 :  Chart11  .’ 
HOUSEHOLD  SAVING  RATES  COMPARED 
:  (as  Percent  of  Disposable  Income) 
Percent 
LI) 
I  I 
0.‘.  .  I-  1  I  i  .  I  .  I 
19778  ,_  1980  1985  1968 
Source:  Organization  for  Economic  Cooperation  and  Deveiopment. 
Note:  Reprinted  from Robert N. McCauley  and  Steven A. Zimmer.“Explaining 
International  Differences.in  the  Cost of Capital.”  Federal  Reserve  Bank 
uf  New York  Wafter/y  Review/Summer lgS9.  p.  17. 
Percent 
100 
Chart  12 
HOUSEHOLD  DEBT 
(as  Percent  of  Disposable  Income) 
90 




1970  72  74  76  76  60  82  64  06 
Source:  Organizetion  for  Economic  Cooperation  and  Development. 
Note:  Reprinted  from  McCauley  and  Zimmer.  (see Chart  10). p.  18. 
88 
economic  stability,  and  relatively  close  relations  be- 
tween  nonfinancial  corporations  and banks,  Japanese 
and  German  firms  are  ,able  to  use  less  expensive 
shorter-term  floating-rate  debt,  while U.S.  firms must 
regularly  issue  long-term  fixed-rate  debt  to  insure 
against  inflation-caused  rises  in  short  rates. 
Public Investment &ending  in the 
Group  of Seven. 
David  Aschauer  [Z] points  out  that  while  private 
savings  and  investment  levels  are. important  deter- 
minants  of  economic  growth,  another  determinant 
exists-the  share  of government  spending  devoted 
to  public  investment. 
Aschauer  follows the  U.N.  System  of National  Ac- 
counts  in ‘distinguishing  between  public  investment 
and  public  consumption.  He  therefore  treats  public 
purchases  of nonmilitary  investment-type  goods  as 
public  investment.  Public  investment  thus  defined 
includes  such things  as roads,  highways,  dams,  water 
and sewer’systems,  mass transit,  airport  facilities, port 
facilities,  etc.  Aschauer  argues  persuasively  that these 
hinds  of expenditures  have  “positive  direct  and  in- 
direct  effects  on  private.  sector  output  and  produc- 
tivity  growth.”  [Z, p.171 
Aschauer  finds  that  the  United  States  used  a far 
smaller  percentage  of its gross  domestic  product  for 
public  net  (of  depreciation)25  investment  in  the 
1967-85  period  than .any other  of the Group  of Seven 
industrialized  countries.  The  differential  between 
Japan  and the  U.S.  is especially  striking.  Japan  used 
5.1  percent  of its GDP  for public net investment  over 
the  1967-85  time  period,  while  the  U.S.  used  less 
than  one  percent. 
VIII. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Abramovitz  argues  that  the  slower  rate  of produc- 
tivity  growth  in the  U.S.  is an understandable  impli- 
cation  “. . . of a process  of international  productivity 
catch-up  and  convergence  that  is,  in certain  condi- 
tions,  natural  and  foreseeable  and,  in  the  long-run 
sense,  desirable.  Desirable  not  only  for the  countries 
that  are  catching  up,  .  .  . but  also  desirable  for  the 
.  .  . United  States.”  [ 1,  p.  1] 
In the  same  vein,  Lipsey  and  Kravis argue  that  the 
U.S.  savings  rate,  while  not  stellar,  is not  too  bad, 
and  they  conclude  that  “.  .  .  Americans  are  not 
a  Aschaker  does  not  adjust  for cross-country  differences  in dehi- 
tions  of  depreciation. 
FEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK OF  RICHMOND  33 significantly  less forward-looking  than  people  in other 
countries.”  Hayashi  also concludes  that  after  adjust- 
ment,  net  savings  rates  in Japan  and the  U.S.  are not 
too  different. 
Mincer  and  Higuchi,  on the  other  hand,  show  that 
Japanese  firms  use  managerial  policies  that  promote 
better  human  development  and  more  rapid  worker 
acceptance  of technological  advances.  They  argue, 
furthermore,  that  the  Japanese  firms  adopted  these 
policies  out  of necessity  after  World  War  II,  and that 
U.S.  firms  are  not  likely  to  change  their  policies 
toward  human  investment  unless  they  are forced  to 
do  so  for  one  reason  or  another. 
McCauley  and  Zimmer  and  Aschauer  also  reach 
gloomy  conclusions.  McCauley  and  Zimmer  con- 
clude  that  “.  .  .  a  considerable  gap  in  the  cost  of 
capital  between  the  United  States  and  Great 
Britain,  on  the  one  hand,  and  Japan  and  Germany, 
on  the  other,  is likely  to  remain  open.”  [14,  p.  25) 
Aschauer  concludes  that  too  much  of U.S.  govern- 
mental  spending  goes  into  public  consumption.  He 
expects  the  United  States  to  continue  to  have 
relatively  slow  growth  unless  the  government  in- 
creases  its  public  investment  expenditures. 
Abramoviu  and  others  have  pointed  out  that  in- 
vestment  in  human  capital  and  expenditures  for 
research  and  development  may  well  be  the  key  to 
the  future  economic  growth  of the  U.S.  relative  to 
that  of other  countries.  Investment  in human  capital 
is  difficult  to  measure,  however,  even  within  one 
country  over  time. 
Many  economists  (including  Abramovitz  and 
Lipsey  and  Kravis)  use  either  years  of education  or 
educational  expenditures  as proxies  for  investment 
in human  capital,  but  real monetary  expenditures  for 
education  or years  of schooling  may  not  capture  the 
quality  of  education  provided.  For  example,  coun- 
tries  that  have  relatively  minor  problems  with  drugs 
and  violence  in  the  schools  may  provide  the  same 
levels  of  education  more  efficiently  than  countries 
with  major  drug  and  violence  problems.  Also,  as 
Mincer  and  Higuchi  show,  on-the-job  training  may 
do more  than  traditional  forms  of educational  expen- 
diture  to  increase  human  capital  in  times  of  rapid 
technological  change. 
Given  these  alternative  interpretations,  what  can 
one  conclude  about  the  U.S.  rate  of  saving  and  in- 
vestment?  Is  the  savings  crisis  a “chimera,”  as  Paul 
Craig  Roberts  writes  in  R~.~~%x.ss  WeeR, or  is  it  real, 
calling  for  a  national  nonpartisan  effort,  as  Louis 
Rukeyser  argues? No  categorical  answer  emerges,  but 
there  is probably  an element  of truth  in some  of the 
lamentations  about  the  outlook  for future  economic 
growth  in  the  U.S.’  relative  to  that  of  its  stronger 
rivals. 
On  the  other  hand,  as was  shown  in the  first  part 
of  this  paper,  virtually  all  of  the  debate  about  the 
existence  or extent  of a saving  shortage  in the United 
States  is based  upon  NIPA  data,  and  the  so-called 
shortage  does  not  show  up  in  savings  rates  derived 
from  alternative  national  accounting  systems.  Eisner , 
Roberts,  and  Samuelson  are  thus  also  correct  in 
pointing  out  that  the  concern  about  the  savings  crisis 
is  overblown. 
In any event,  the  remedy  for slow economic  growth 
in the  United  States  is clearly  not  as  simple  as rais- 
ing the  conventionally  measured  savings  rate.  In fact, 
a  number  of  endeavors  that  would  increase  future 
economic  growth,  such  as directing  more  government 
spending  toward  infrastructure  items  and  toward 
human  capital  (improving  the  education  and  train- 
ing system  and  promoting  public  health  and  safety), 
actually  would  her  the  conventionally  measured 
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